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The 1990s were a great time to be a top executive in a large U.S.
company. Figure 1 shows the median total compensation of chief ex-
ecutive officers in S&P 500 Industrials (that is, the S&P 500 companies
excluding utilities and finance firms) from 1992 through 2000. The bar
height depicts median total compensation in CPI-adjusted 2001-
constant dollars, including salaries, realized bonuses, stock options, and
other pay.' Over this period, median total compensation nearly tripled
from $2.3 million in 1992 to over $6.5 million in 2000. Figure 1 also
depicts how the composition of CEO pay has evolved over time.2 The
figure shows that the increase in CEO pay in S&P 500 Industrials dur-
ing the 1990s primarily reflects a dramatic growth in stock options
(valued on date of grant), which swelled from 27 percent to 51 percent
of total compensation, representing a five-fold increase in dollar
terms. ;
Table 1 shows that the option-driven escalation in CEO pay lev-
els is not limited to S&P 500 Industrials. Panel A shows that median
pay in S&P 500 Financial Services companies increased 300 percent,
from $2.6 million to almost $11 million from 1992 to 2000, while pay in
smaller firms (defined as companies in the -S&P MidCap 400 and
SmallCap 600) more than doubled, from $823,000 to $1.8 million. Me-
dian pay in so-called "New Economy" firms increased 130 percent,
from $1.4 million to $3.2 million. Panel B shows that the large pay in-
t Professor, Marshall School of Business and School of Law, University of Southern Cali-
fornia.
I Data from Standard & Poor's ("S&P's") ExecuComp database, available online at
<http://www.compustat.com> (visited Apr 27, 2002). Stock options are valued using Execu-
Comp's modified BIack-Scholes methodology (which uses an expected life equal to 70 percent of
the actual term, and truncates unusually high or low volatilities and dividend yields). Other com-
pensation includes restricted stock grants, payouts from long-term incentive plans, perquisites,
and benefits.
2 Pay component percentages are derived from S&P's ExecuComp data by computing the
percentages for each CEO, and averaging across CEOs.
3 I define New Economy firms as companies with primary Standard Industrial Classifica-
tion ("SIC") designations of 3570 (Computer and Office Equipment), 3571 (Electronic Com-
puters), 3572 (Computer Storage Devices), 3576 (Computer Communication Equipment), 3577
(Computer Peripheral Equipment), 3661 (Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus), 3674 (Semicon-
ductor and Related Devices), 5045 (Computers and Software Wholesalers), 5961 (Electronic
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creases in these three categories of companies is driven primarily by
increasing stock option grants.
FIGURE 1
CEO PAY IN S&P 500 INDUSTRIALS, 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Note: Median pay levels (in 2001-constant dollars) based on S&P's ExeeuComp data for
S&P 500 CEOs (financial firms and utilities excluded). Total compensation (indicated by
bar height) defined as the sum of salaries, bonuses, benefits, stock options (valued on date
of grant using the Black-Scholes formula), stock grants, and other compensation.
Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David Walker ("BFW") argue
that "much of what is observed in the world of executive compensa-
tion" can be explained by managerial opportunism and influence over
captive boards of directors. Under their "managerial power" hypothe-
sis, executive pay practices reflect the actions of powerful executives
who can influence the terms of their own pay packages, and do so in a
way that "camouflages" pay to mitigate external scrutiny and criticism.
While acknowledging that the "optimal contracting" and "managerial
Mail-Order Houses), 7370 (Computer Programming and Data Processing), 7371 (Computer Pro-
gramming Service), 7372 (Prepackaged Software), and 7373 (Computer Integrated Systems De-
sign).
4 Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried, and David Walker, Managerial Power and Executive Com-
pensation, 69 U Chi L Rev 751,785 (2002).
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power" explanations are not mutually exclusive and that both may
play a role, BFW conclude that the managerial power view can better
explain patterns and practices of executive compensation. In particu-
lar, BFW argue that managerial power can explain several "puzzling"
features of option plans, including why exercise prices are set at grant-
date market prices and are not indexed to general market movements
(but are often reset following market declines), why options often
contain so-called "reload" provisions, and why firms allow executives
to exercise early and diversify (or otherwise hedge the risk of their op-
tion and stock holdings). In addition, BFW claim that managerial
power explains why U.S. executives earn higher pay than their interna-
tional counterparts, and why CEO pay is higher for CEOs with more
power.
TABLE 1
MEDIAN COMPENSATION AND OPTIONS AS PERCENT OF PAY FOR
CEOS IN FINANCIAL FIRMS, SMALL FIRMS, AND
NEW ECONOMY FIRMS, 1992-2000
PANELA. PANELB.
Median Total Compensation ($000s) Average Option Grant as Percent of
Total CEO Pay
S&P 500 Smaller New
Financial Firms Economy
S&P 500 Smaller New
Financial Firms Economy
1992 $2,621 $823 $1,418 19.2% 18.5% 35.0%
1993 $2,832 $929 $1,298 20.6% 19.4% 36.4%
1994 $3,150 $1,074 $1,609 30.1% 22.7% 37.5%
1995 $3,126 $1,063 $1,371 22.0% 20.3% 36.8%
1996 $4,702 $1,240 $1,452 30.7% 26.0% 42.1%
1997 $5,483 $1,473 $2,163 35.9% 28.6% 49.4%
1998 $6,341 $1,583 $1,958 42.8% 32.6% 48.7%
1999 $8,978 $1,685 $2,513 49.3% 35.7% 55.5%
2000 $10,726 $1,767 $3,241 49.3% 35.7% 54.3%
Note: Data from S&P's ExeeuComp database. S&P 500 exclude financial services (SIC codes
6000-6999) and utilities (4900-4999). Smaller firms are those in S&P's MidCap 400 and SmaIlCap
600. New economy firms defined as companies with primary SIC codes 3570,3571,3572, 3576,
3577, 3661, 3674, 5045, 5961, 7370, 7371, 7372, and 7373. Total pay (in 2001-constant dollars) in-
cludes salaries, bonuses, stock options, restricted stock, payouts from long-term plans, and bene-
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The BFW analysis is comprehensive and provocative, and their
evidence that pay practices reflect more than optimal contracting con-
cerns is compelling. Equally compelling is their evidence that most
pay decisions are not made by truly independent boards in legitimate
arm's length transactions. Ultimately, though, their managerial power
view is both problematic as a theoretical matter, and too simplistic to
explain executive pay practices. Moreover, their hypothesis is largely
inconsistent with the most important development in executive com-
pensation practices: the recent escalation in option-based compensa-
tion for both top-level and lower-level executives. Overall, their pre-
scription to focus on rent extraction in examining "the regulation and
practice of corporate governance" is potentially misguided and diverts
attention from more important issues regarding executive compensa-
tion.
I begin in Part I of this Commentary by examining the manage-
rial power hypothesis, which asserts that incumbent executives exer-
cise power and influence over captive directors in order to extract
rents through their compensation arrangements. I show that the esca-
lation in executive pay during the 1990s coincided with increasingly
independent corporate boards; this evidence is inconsistent with the
managerial power hypothesis. In addition, I show that CEOs hired
from the outside with no ties to the existing board enjoy especially at-
tractive pay packages; this evidence is also directly inconsistent with
the view that CEOs use their relationships with their boards to extract
rents. I also distinguish between rent extraction (which requires cap-
tive boards) and CEO bargaining power (which can generate higher
pay even in arm's length transactions), and offer reasons why CEO
bargaining power may have increased in recent years. This distinction
is important: the ability to extract rents or bargain might both be de-
scribed as "managerial power" and suggest very different efficiency
implications and policy prescriptions.
Part II critiques the "outrage costs" introduced by BFW in con-
junction with their managerial power hypothesis. BFW argue that
these costs explain why rent-extracting executives seek to increase pay
levels through option grants rather than through increases in cash
compensation (because doing so reduces public outrage), and why
firms use compensation consultants and adopt uniform compensation
practices (because following "norms" minimizes outrage). I establish
that these costs are critical in developing their managerial power hy-
pothesis, since otherwise managerial power would affect the level but
not necessarily the structure of executive pay. I present historical evi-
dence on "outrage" which suggests that the trends in pay illustrated in
Figure 1 are starkly at odds with the BFW hypothesis. Finally, I argue
that the outrage costs as developed by BFW are sufficiently vague to
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be irrefutable-the authors can argue that virtually any unobserved
practice is avoided because it would cause outrage.
Part III offers an alternative hypothesis that I believe explains
pay patterns and practices better than both the optimal contracting
and managerial power views. The hypothesis is based on two assump-
tions: (1) risk-averse and undiversified executives (and employees)
understand that stock option compensation is highly risky, and dis-
count the value of options appropriately; and (2) because of account-
ing and cash-flow considerations, companies routinely (but inappro-
priately) treat options as relatively inexpensive ways to convey com-
pensation. I offer evidence supporting these assumptions, including
the increasing prevalence of "broad-based" option programs difficult
to justify from both an optimal contracting and managerial power per-
spective. I show how this alternative hypothesis can explain why exer-
cise prices for options are set at or below current market prices and
are not indexed for market movements, why options were repriced
following market downturns and why this practice has largely disap-
peared, why options often contain reload provisions, and why firms al-
low executives to exercise early and diversify.
In the Conclusion, I contrast the policy implications suggested by
the managerial power and "perceived-cost" views of executive com-
pensation. Prescriptions to mitigate managerial power problems focus
on corporate governance solutions such as increased board independ-
ence. In contrast, prescriptions to mitigate perceived-cost problems
focus on director education and changes in accounting and tax rules.
I. THE MANAGERIAL PoWER VIEW
Underlying the BFW managerial power hypothesis are two indis-
putable facts: (1) CEOs (like the rest of us) prefer more rather than
less compensation, and (2) CEOs and other top managers are able to
influence both the level and structure of their pay. In an earlier work, I
observed that the CEO's influence over pay is typically indirect, and
reflects that judgment calls by well-intentioned boards tend systemati-
cally to favor the CEO.5 For example, faced with a range of market
data on competitive pay levels, committees tend to err on the high
side.' Or, faced with a choice between a sensible compensation plan
and a slightly inferior plan favored by the CEO, the committee will
defer to management.7 However, the existence of these opportunities
5 Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds, 3B
The Handbook of Labor Economics 2485,2517-18 (Elsevier 1999) (dismissing the claim that "en-
trenched compensation committees" rubber stamp lucrative pay programs for CEOs).
6 Id at 2518.
7 Id.
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for rent extraction does not necessarily imply that executives are ef-
fective in exploiting these self-enrichment opportunities, or that such
behavior (to the extent it exists) has a first-order effect in explaining
patterns and practices of CEO pay.
BFW argue that even nominally independent boards are not truly
independent because the CEO controls the nomination process, main-
tains social relations with board members, and expects board support.
They argue that "boards have become more effective monitors of the
CEO performance during the 1990s," citing evidence that independent
directors increasingly constitute a majority of the board and its key
committees (including nominating and compensation)." This trend to-
ward more independent boards, coupled with the simultaneous escala-
tion in CEO pay illustrated in Figure 1, seems directly inconsistent
with the hypothesis that CEO pay patterns and practices are driven by
managerial power considerations.
The managerial power view focuses on incumbent executives ex-
ercising power and influence over outside directors who are "con-
nected to the executives by bonds of interest, collegiality, or affinity.""
Therefore, one way to test the managerial power hypothesis is to
compare the compensation of CEOs hired from the outside (without
established connections to the board) to CEOs hired from the inside
(who presumably have such connections). Table 2 presents ordinary
least-squares regressions of the logarithm of cash pay and total pay for
the sample of newly hired CEOs in the ExecuComp database. Inde-
pendent variables include a dummy variable if the new CEO was
hired from the outside (rather than from within the company), the
logarithm of sales to control for company size, and dummy variables
for S&P 500 firms, financial services firms, utilities, new economy
firms, and fiscal years.
8 Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker, 69 U Chi L Rev at 773 (cited in note 4).




ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES REGRESSIONS OF THE LOGARITHM OF
CASH PAY AND TOTAL PAY FOR NEWLY HIRED CEOs, 1992-2000
PANELA PANEL B
New CEOs in First Partial Year New CEOs in First Full Year
Ln(Cash Pay) Ln(Total Pay) Ln(Cash Pay) Ln(Total Pay)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 4.823 5.621 .4.946 5.488
(Dummy) -.2435 (-3.1) .6759 (8.1) .0364 (0.5) .1244(1.2)Outside Hfire
Ln(Sales) .2784 (12.5) .2794 (12.0) .2522 (12.7) .2952 (10.3)
(Dummy) .2836 (2.3) .1719 (1.3) .2715 (2.6) .2463 (1.6)
Finance
(Dummy) -.2890 (-2.2) -.7321 (-5.4) -.3338 (-3.1) -.4384 (-2.9)
Utility
(Dummy) .1576 (1.9) .5208 (5.9) .2031 (2.8) .3712(3.5)
S&P 500
(Dummy) -.1668 (1.8) .2873(3.0) .0939(l.0) .3561(2.6)
New Economy
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
W 34% 43% 42% 37%
Sample Size 645 643 461 460
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. Sample is based on all new CEOs in the S&P 500, the S&P Mid-
Cap 400, and the S&P SmallCap 600. Cash pay includes salaries and bonuses. Total pay includes
salaries, bonuses, stock options, restricted stock, payouts from long-term plans, and benefits. Stock
options are valued at the grant-date using ExecuComp's modified Black-Scholes methodology.
Outside hires are defined as individuals who have been employed by the company for less than
one year before their appointment as CEO.
Panel A of Table 2 analyzes compensation for newly hired CEOs
in their first partial year as CEO. The coefficient on "outside hires" in
column (1) is negative and significant, indicating that CEOs hired
from the outside earn about 22 percent less cash compensation than
CEOs hired from inside the firm.'° This negative coefficient might re-
flect that outside hires are unable to extract rents and earn lower pay
levels, but more plausibly reflects partial-year compensation: although
inside hires only receive CEO pay for a fraction of the year, they re-
ceive pay in other positions for the earlierportion of the year. How-
ever, column (2) shows that outside hires earn 96 percent more total
compensation than do inside hires. Under the managerial power hy-
pothesis, new hires from outside the company are expected to earn
lower total pay levels (because they cannot yet extract rents from the
board) but relatively higher cash compensation (since there is no need
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to camouflage payments through stock-based pay). The results that
outside hires earn lower cash compensation but higher total compen-
sation (primarily reflecting stock options, restricted stock grants, and
sign-on bonuses) are inconsistent with the managerial power hypothe-
sis.
Fee and Hadlock show that incoming executives receive initial
option and stock grants that (more than) offset the value of unvested
options and stock cancelled when they left their former employer."
These findings are consistent with the results in Table 2 but are incon-
sistent with the BFW managerial power hypothesis, since if payments
reflect rents created by captive boards, these rents should not be
transferable to other firms. In any case, Panel B of Table 2 analyzes
compensation for new CEOs in their first full fiscal year as CEO.
These data are not contaminated by partial-year compensation or
one-time payments made to outside hires for benefits lost at former
employers. The results in columns (3) and (4) show that, by the first
full fiscal year, cash and total compensation is insignificantly higher
for CEOs hired from the outside than for CEOs hired from the inside.
Since the outside hires have weaker ties to the current board, these re-
sults again are inconsistent with the managerial power hypothesis.
In fact, the mere existence of outside hires is largely inconsistent
with the managerial power view, because systematic rents above com-
petitive pay levels will make executives less likely to leave voluntarily,
and make attracting executives from other firms more expensive. But,
as documented in my earlier work, companies in the 1990s (when rent
extraction through the exercise of managerial power was supposedly
high) were much more likely to hire CEOs from outside the company
than in the 1980s or 1970s." And, as documented by Fee and Hadlock,
executives changing companies during the 1990s received large pay
increases, indicating that alleged "rents" were transferable (which sug-
gests they are not rents at all). 3
If not rent extraction, then why have pay levels increased so dra-
matically over the past decade? One plausible alternative explanation
is that CEO bargaining positions have increased over this time period,
perhaps because CEO marginal productivities have increased," or be-
11 C. Edward Fee and Charles J. Hadlock, Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market
for CEO Talent at 31, working paper (2001), available online at <http://www.afajoforg/
Pdf/meeting2002/fee.paper.pdf> (visited Apr 19, 2002) (reporting that CEOs receive higher
stock options from their new employers than they did with their previous employer).
12 Murphy, Executive Compensation at 2545-50 (cited in note 5) (showing trends in outside
CEO hires since 1970).
13 See Fee and Hadlock, Raids, Rewards, and Reputations at 32 (cited in note 11) (finding
that "the overwhelming majority of job movements ... [resulted] in substantial raises).
14 See Charles P. Himmelberg and R. Glenn Hubbard, Incentive Pay and the Market for
CEOs: An Analysis of Pay-for-Performance Sensitivity at 3-4, working paper (2000), available
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cause general "managerial capital" has become important relative to
firm-specific capital. Changes in bargaining power are consistent with
both efficiency and with arm's length negotiations (which, after all, do
not require a perfectly competitive market for managerial talent), and
are importantly distinct from rent extraction (even though both pre-
dict higher-paid top executives).
II. OUTRAGE COSTS
Under the managerial power hypothesis proposed by BFW, ex-
tractable rents are ultimately limited by "outrage costs." BFW use out-
rage costs to explain why option plans (exercise prices, vesting provi-
sions, etc.) across firms are generally uniform (because following
"norms" reduces outrage) and why companies use compensation con-
sultants. In earlier drafts of their Article, they also used outrage costs
to explain the recent escalation in stock options (because cash would
generate more outrage).
Outrage costs are critical to the BFW analysis, since without
these costs there is no reason to expect a priori that rent extraction
would affect the structure rather than just the level of executive pay.
Suppose, for example, that managerial power resulted in the CEO
holding too many stock options from an optimal contracting perspec-
tive. Then, we would expect to observe voluntary and Pareto-
improving transactions where the executive exchanges options for in-
creased cash compensation, increasing both executive welfare and
company profits. (Formally, ignoring what economists call wealth ef-
fects, the derived optimal contract is the same if one maximizes firm
profits holding constant executive utility, or maximizes executive util-
ity holding constant firm profits.)
I am sympathetic to the view that external perceptions can influ-
ence executive pay." And there exists some anecdotal evidence sup-
porting the importance of outrage costs. 6 However, there is little evi-
dence that public outrage has played an important role in influencing
the patterns and practices of CEO pay depicted in Figure 1. In fact,
online at <httpJww.gsb.columbia.edu/facultylghubbard/Papers/ceolO.pdf> (visited Apr 19,
2002) (arguing that increased CEO compensation may be related to increased marginal produc-
tivity, market demand for CEOs, and the supply elasticity of CEOs with similar skills).
15 As noted by BFW, the outrage constraint is conceptually similar to the "political con-
straint" introduced by Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-
Management Incentives, 98 J Polit Econ 225, 262 (1990) (suggesting that "political forces" limit
large payoffs for exceptional performance).
16 For example, in 1991, General Dynamics was intensely criticized for its "Gain Sharing"
plan that provided cash payouts for increases in the company's stock price. When the company
replaced the cash plan with a traditional option plan (that provided roughly the same payouts)
the criticism abated. See Jay Dial and Kevin J. Murphy, Incentives, Downsizing, and Value Crea-
tion at General Dynamics, 37 J Fin Econ 261,261-64 (1995).
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the surprising lack of outrage over the recent escalation in CEO pay
has been one of the more striking developments of the last decade."
Public perceptions of CEO pay clearly surpassed the "outrage"
level in 1991-92. ' Feature stories on CEO pay aired on the nightly
news broadcasts of the three major networks.'9 CNN, 60 Minutes, and
Nightline also devoted segments to CEO pay." The controversy
heightened with the introduction of Graef Crystal's 1991 expos6 on
CEO pay, In Search of Excess.2' By the 1992 presidential elections, all
leading candidates had position statements on escalating CEO pay.
Legislation was introduced in both the House and the Senate to curb
runaway executive compensation, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission passed sweeping new disclosure rules to make compensation
more transparent, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board be-
gan an ultimately unsuccessful campaign to impose an accounting
charge for executive options.
How did the 1991-1992 outrage episode affect executive
compensation? Apparently, not much. From 1992 to 2000, median
salaries for S&P 500 CEOs increased by 17 percent after inflation
while bonuses doubled.n Moreover, the escalation in stock option
compensation documented in Figure 1 and Table 1 was not "caused"
by the outrage but rather continued a trend towards option
compensation that began in the mid-1980s.2'
In fact, the new SEC disclosure rules introduced in 1992 were fo-
cused primarily on providing better details on stock option compensa-
tion, thus making it harder for CEOs to camouflage or hide compen-
sation in stock options. The fact that trends in option grants continued
17 See David Leonhardt, Why Is This Man Smiling?: Executive Pay Drops Off the Political
Radar, NY Times D5 (Apr 16, 2000) (noting that although executive salaries soared during the
1990s, "outrage is minimal").
18 I discuss the causes and consequences of this public outrage more fully in Kevin J. Mur-
phy, Politics, Economics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U Cin L Rev 713,713-17 (1995).
19 Id at 713.
20 Id.
21 Graef S. Crystal, In Search of Excess (Norton 1991).
22 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Campaign '92: From Quayle to Clinton, Politicians Are Pouncing on
the Hot Issue of Top Executive's Hefty Salaries, Wall St J A14 (Jan 15,1992). Bill Clinton promised
to "end the practice of allowing companies to take unlimited tax deductions for excessive execu-
tive pay." Id. George Bush's running mate, Dan Quayle, warned that corporate boards should
"curtail some of these exorbitant salaries paid to corporate executives that are unrelated to pro-
ductivity." Id. Bob Kerrey called it "'unacceptable' for corporate executives to make millions of
dollars while their companies are posting losses." Id. Paul Tsongas argued that "excessive pay is
hurting America's ability to compete in the international marketplace." Id. Pat Buchanan argued,
"You can't have executives running around making $4 million while their workers are being laid
off" Id.
23 See Figure 1.
24 See Brian J. Hall and Jeffery B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113
Q J Econ 653, 653-91 (1998) (discussing the "large increase in CEO holdings of stock and stock
options that occurred between 1980 and 1994").
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unabated following these disclosure rules suggests that the BFW "out-
rage constraint" was not binding.
The evidence from the 1990s suggests that public outrage has not
driven executive pay practices. However, the primary problem with
the BFW view of outrage costs is not the lack of empirical support but
rather that, as developed, it is irrefutable. For example, BFW argue
that companies grant "at the money" options, hire compensation con-
sultants, and adhere to established norms because doing otherwise
would cause outrage. Taken to its extreme, the authors could argue
that virtually any unobserved practice is avoided because it would be
considered outrageous. Before concluding that otherwise-preferred
compensation arrangements are avoided because of outrage costs, it is
necessary to provide evidence that (1) the arrangements would, in
fact, cause outrage, and (2) that the outrage costs exceed the benefits
of the otherwise-preferred compensation arrangements.
III. THE PERCEIVED-COST VIEW
Under the optimal contracting approach adopted by most finan-
cial economists, stock options are viewed as incentive compensation
that provides a direct link between executive pay and company per-
formance. This incentive rationale for stock options, however, holds at
most for top-level executives who can take direct actions that affect
company stock prices and does not hold for lower-level managers and
employees. And yet, most options are granted to employees below the
top executive level.*2 Table 3 shows the average percentage of annual
option grants awarded to executives and employees below the top five
"proxy-named" executives.! The table shows that nearly 80 percent of
options granted in S&P 500 Industrials, S&P 500 Financials, and New
Economy firms in 2000 were granted to executives and employees be-
low the top five and also shows that grants below the top five (as a
percent of all grants) have been generally increasing since 1992 in all
sectors. These results indicate that the escalation in option-based
compensation illustrated in Table 1 and Figure 1 is not limited to the
CEO but rather reflects a proportional escalation for executives be-
low the top tier.
25 See, for example, John E. Core and Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-
Executive Employees, 61 J Fin Econ 253,265 (2001) (noting that 66.9 percent of options are held
by non-executive employees).
26 Calculations are based on ExeeuComp data and include only firms where at least one of
the top five executives received options during the year.
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TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL OPTION GRANTS AWARDED TO
EXECUTIVES AND EMPLOYEES BELOW THE TOP FIVE, 1992-2000
Fiscal S&P 500 S&P 500 Smaller New
Year Industrials Financial Firms Economy
1992 77.6% 75.2% 63.9% 78.0%
1993 75.7% 77.6% 62.0% 78.1%
1994 74.2% 71.8% 62.2% 76.1%
1995 76.4% 77.5% 63.5% 77.7%
1996 76.1% 72.6% 62.9% 76.8%
1997 76.1% 73.1% 63.0% 77.5%
1998 77.4% 76.8% 65.6% 79.4%
1999 77.2% 76.9% 64.7% 77.1%
2000 78.9% 77.0% 67.0% 79.6%
Note: Data are from S&P's ExecuComp database, and include only firms
where at least one of the top five executives received options during the year.
S&P 500 exclude financial services (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (4900-
4999). Smaller firms are those in S&P's MidCap 400 and SmalCap 600. New
economy firms are defined as companies with primary SIC codes 3570, 3571,
3572,3576,3577,3661,3674,5045,5961,7370,7371,7372, and 7373.
The increasing prevalence of broad-based option grants offers
clear evidence that option plans are not exclusively motivated by op-
timal contracting concerns. But neither are such plans an obvious im-
plication of the managerial power view. Given that the escalation in
executive pay is largely driven by options, it is worth exploring expla-
nations that are consistent with the increased use of options through-
out the company. I offer as an alternative view to both optimal con-
tracting and managerial power a hypothesis based on two assump-
tions. First, risk-averse and undiversified employees (rationally) per-
ceive that stock option compensation is highly risky and discount the
value of options appropriately. Second, companies routinely but erro-
neously perceive options as relatively low-cost ways to convey com-
pensation. In the remainder of this Part, I will justify these assump-
tions and demonstrate that this "perceived-cost" view helps explain
the escalation in both CEO pay and broad-based option plans and is
also consistent with the evidence BFW offer in support of their mana-
gerial power hypothesis.
A. Assumption 1: Undiversified Employees Perceive Options as
Having Low Values
Compensation consultants and academic researchers routinely
use standard option pricing models (such as Black-Scholes) to ap-
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proximate the value of stock options.V However, while these models
are appropriate for valuing options traded on exchanges, they are not
appropriate for valuing options held by undiversified, risk-averse em-
ployees who can not freely sell the options or hedge their risk. In two
recent papers, Brian Hall and I show that undiversified employees
value options at only a fraction of their Black-Scholes value.n In sup-
port of this result, we offer evidence that executives participating in
exchanges of cash for stock options typically demand large "risk pre-
miums" and that executives routinely complain that Black-Scholes
values are not adequately adjusted for risk and non-transferability. In
addition, we show how incorporating risk into the analysis has impli-
cations for a wide range of compensation practices, including exercise
prices, repricing behavior, vesting provisions, and early exercise poli-
cies and practices.
B. Assumption 2: Companies Perceive Options as Inexpensive Ways
to Convey Compensation
The economic (or "opportunity") cost of an option is appropri-
ately measured as the amount an outside investor would pay for the
option. The outside investor is generally free to trade or sell the op-
tion and also can take actions (such as short-selling the underlying
stock) to hedge away the risk of the option. Ignoring complications re-
lated to potential forfeiture and early exercise, standard methodolo-
gies such as Black-Scholes provide an estimate of what an outside in-
vestor would pay and are, therefore, appropriate for measuring the
company's cost of granting options.
From the perspective of many boards and practitioners, however,
the cost of granting options is perceived to be far below their true
economic cost. Options are perceived as inexpensive because they can
be granted without any cash outlay and without incurring an account-
ing charge.2 Moreover, under U.S. accounting and tax rules, when op-
27 Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J
Polit Econ 637 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 Bell J Econ &
Mgmt Sci 141 (1973) (using Black-Scholes and other theories to derive formulas for pricing put
and call options).
28 See Brian J. Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J
Acct Econ 3, 13-15 (Feb 2002); Brian . Hall and Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for
Executive Stock Options, 90 Am Econ Rev 209,211 (2000).
29 Although companies may take an immediate charge for options granted under State-
ment 123 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, most companies choose to account for
options using Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 25. Under APB 25, the compensation
expense associated with an employee stock option grant equals the "spread" between the fair
market value and the exercise price at the date that both the number of shares and the exercise
price are determinable or "fixed." Typical options that vest with the passage of time, and that
have an exercise price equal to the fair market value on the date of grant, qualify for "fixed ac-
counting" and generate zero compensation expense (since the number of shares and exercise
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tions are exercised, accounting income is unchanged, but taxable in-
come is reduced. The primary cost of options as perceived by many
boards is the "dilution cost" which can be mitigated through stock re-
purchase programs.30
BFW consider but largely dismiss accounting explanations for op-
tion practices because the value of option grants is disclosed in foot-
notes to the annual report even though not included in reported in-
come. They claim that, if stock markets are reasonably efficient, im-
posing an accounting charge on stock options would reduce reported
earnings but would not affect stock prices (because the information is
already available through footnote disclosure) and, therefore, should
not affect option-granting practices. I fully accept that markets are
reasonably efficient and also agree that imposing an accounting
charge would not directly affect company stock prices. However,
based on countless discussions (often heated arguments) with com-
pensation consultants, practitioners, and executives, I am convinced
that managers are fixated on the accounting consequences of alterna-
tive compensation practices and that this fixation reflects more than
the effect of accounting rules on stock prices.
There is substantial evidence that managers respond to account-
ing concerns in ways that seem irrational to financial economists. For
example, when Statement 106 of the Financial Accounting Standards
Board was passed, imposing an accounting charge for post-retirement
health-care liabilities, managers predicted that stock prices would fall
with reported income. Stock prices did not fall (because markets are
efficient and the economic liability was already incorporated in stock
prices), but companies nonetheless made dramatic cutbacks in the
medical benefits for retirees." I believe that companies would respond
even more dramatically to changes in the accounting treatment of
stock options.
price is fixed as of the grant date, and the spread is zero on the grant date).
30 See Kathleen M. Kahle, When a Buyback Isn't a Buybaclc- Open Market Repurchases and
Employee Options, 63 J Fin Econ (forthcoming 2002) (noting that firms prefer repurchasing op-
tions since the per-share value of the firm remains unchanged).
31 See, for example, Thomas Watterson, Accounting Changes Bad for Retirees, Boston
Globe 51 (Jan 18, 1993) ("[Djamage control will come at the expense of current and retired em-
ployees"); Ellen E. Schultz, This Won't Hurt: Companies Transform Retiree-Medical Plans Into
Source of Profits, Wall St J Al (Oct 25,2000) (discussing the effect of Financial Accounting Stan-




COMPANIES REPRICING STOCK OPTIONS, 1992-2000
PANEL A. PANEL B.
All Firms Companies' 50 Percent Price 
Drops
over Prior 24 Months
o o
Fiscal 0 0~
Year o 0C Po
1992 0.9% 0.0% 0.4% 9.2% 8.3% 0.0% 0.0% 29.4%
1993 0.4% 0.0% 1.8% 7.2% 0.0% 0.0% 13.6% 17.9%
1994 0.8% 0.0% 2.4% 2.3% 3.6% 0.0% 13.6% 10.0%
1995 0.4% 0.0% 2.9% 7.6% 0.0% 0.0% 20.6% 17.9%
1996 1.1% 1.6% 2.2% 10.6% 18.2% 0.0% 10.4% 23.7%
1997 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 16.4% 0.0% 0.0% 7.7% 35.7%
1998 1.3% 2.9% 3.3% 12.2% 7.5% 10.0% 7.1% 23.1%
1999 0.3% 1.4% 1.2% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 6.7%
2000 0.3% 0.0% 0.5% 0.4% 1.4% 0.0% 1.1% 0.6%
Note: Data are from S&P's ExeeuComp database. S&P 500 excludes financial services (SIC
codes 6000-6999) and utilities (4900-4999). Smaller firms are those in S&P's MidCap 400 and
SmallCap 600. New economy firms defined as companies with primary SIC codes 3570, 3571,
3572,3576,3577,3661,3674,5045,5961,7370,7371,7372, and 7373. Panel B is based on a subsam-
ple with fiscal-year closing stock prices less than 50 percent of the (split-adjusted) high price over
the twenty-four months preceding the fiscal closing.
The recent change in accounting rules for option repricing illus-
trates the importance of accounting considerations in stock-option
practices.- Before December 15, 1998, companies granting new or re-
priced options with an exercise price equal to the grant-date market
price were not subject to an accounting charge. After this date, com-
panies repricing options must use "variable accounting" where ac-
counting charges are realized annually based on stock-price apprecia-
tion.
Table 4 explores the incidence of option repricing among differ-
ent groups of firms from 1992 through 2000. Panel A shows the preva-
lence of repricing independent of performance, while Panel B shows
the prevalence of repricing for companies experiencing price declines
of 50 percent or more over the prior twenty-four-month period.
Three primary results emerge. First, with only a few exceptions,
smaller firms and new economy firms are more likely to reprice un-
32 For detailed analyses of this accounting-rule change, see Mary Ellen Carter and Luann J.
Lynch, The Effect ofAccounting on Economic Behavior: Evidence from Stock Option Repricing,
working paper (2001), available online at <http://www.columbia.edu/-mec75/repricing-
labstract.pdf> (visited Apr 19,2002).
33 The results are robust to other definitions of "poor performance."
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derwater options than are S&P 500 companies. Second, until 1999,
small and new economy firms did not appear reluctant to reprice op-
tions following stock-price declines. Third, in spite of the market
downturn beginning in spring 2000, repricings virtually disappeared in
small and new economy firms following the December 1998 changes
in accounting rules.m Given the market downturn for small and new
economy firms, we would have expected an escalation of repricing
programs in these companies. The virtual disappearance of repricing
programs provides strong evidence of the importance of accounting
considerations in compensation decisions.
C. Implications
The perceived-cost view based on the two assumptions described
above yields predictions consistent with a variety of practices cited by
BFW, including the absence of indexed options, uniform exercise
prices, repricing, reload options, and international differences in CEO
pay. In addition, the perceived-cost view helps explain the escalation
in option-based compensation for both top-level and lower-level ex-
ecutives.
1. Market-indexed options.
BFW's primary evidence supporting the managerial power hy-
pothesis is that options are not adjusted for market movements. The
theoretical motivation for awarding indexed options is typically based
on relative performance evaluation (RPE) for risk-averse employees:
to the extent that company stock returns are affected by common
market-wide shocks, paying based on relative performance can reduce
the "noise" in the performance measure without affecting incentives.",
Therefore, the company switching from absolute to relative perform-
ance could reduce compensation (leaving the executive with the same
incentives and at the same expected utility but increasing profits) or
could increase incentives (keeping both company costs and expected
utility constant).
However, the traditional argument for RPE does not translate
into option-type instruments, where payouts are realized only if per-
34 In fact, most of the repricings attributed to fiscal year 1999 in Table 4 are from compa-
nies with June 1999 fiscal closings that repriced prior to December 15,1998.
35 This theoretical justification for RPE was introduced by Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Haz-
ard in Teams, 13 Bell J Econ 74 (1982), and explored empirically for CEOs in Rick Antle and
Abbie Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate
Executives, 24 J Acct Rsrch 1 (1986) (presenting mixed evidence for RPE but ultimately conclud-
ing that it is a factor for some firms); Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy, Relative Performance
Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers, 43 Indust Labor Rel Rev 30-S (1990) (providing stronger
evidence for the RPE theory).
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formance beats the market. These instruments introduce additional
risk on recipients, who face a much larger probability of realizing a
zero payout than they do With conventional options. In fact, given that
stock returns are unbounded on the upside, but cannot be less than
-100 percent on the downside, the probability that a given stock will
earn returns in excess of a value-weighted index is far below 50 per-
cent. In contrast, a typical ten-year, non-indexed option granted at the
money will expire in the money more than 80 percent of the time.
Therefore, indexed options actually impose more rather than less risk
on risk-averse recipients.
The low payout probabilities for indexed options can be miti-
gated, in part, by offering indexed options with initial exercise prices
significantly "in the money." If such options existed, however, they
would likely be cited by BFW as evidence of managerial power. In
addition, indexed options issued in the money would be subject to an
accounting charge (and therefore perceived as costly to granting
firms), even following the complex accounting-avoidance techniques
offered by BFW. Also, options issued in the money (indexed or other-
wise) would not be considered "performance-based" for tax purposes
(which would increase the actual cost to granting firms).
2. Uniform exercise prices.
Conceptually, stock options could be issued with exercise prices
above, below, or equal to the grant-date market value. In practice,
however, exercise prices are almost always set equal to the grant-date
market price. BFW offer this practice as evidence of the managerial
power hypothesis, since lower exercise prices are "value maximizing
for managers" and because the grant-date price is the "lowest possible
exercise price consistent with other constraints."'' However, the prac-
tice is more easily explained by understanding the value and the per-
ceived-cost of executive stock options.
From the perspective of the company, the perceived cost of grant-
ing in-the-money options is considerably higher than the perceived
cost of granting out-of-the-money options. Options with exercise
prices below grant-date market prices incur an accounting charge
equal to the grant-date "spread" between the market and exercise
price. In addition, under Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue
Code, "non-performance-based" compensation in excess of $1 million
is considered unreasonable and therefore not deductible as a compen-
sation expense. In order for option plans to qualify as performance-
based compensation, the options must not be in the money when
36 Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 69 U Chi L Rev at 821 (cited in note 4).
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
granted.3 Similarly, tax-favored Incentive Stock Options (ISOs) must
also have exercise prices at or equal to the grant-date market price.
From the perspective of the employee, options issued at or in the
money work best. Managers will naturally prefer options with lower
exercise prices to options with higher exercise prices. In our earlier
work, Brian Hall and I show that a risk-averse, undiversified executive
will prefer a small number of options with a low exercise price to a
larger number of options with a higher exercise price, where the num-
ber of options is varied to maintain a constant economic cost."s In ad-
dition, we show that, when options are awarded as "add-ons" to exist-
ing compensation plans without meaningful reductions in other forms
of compensation, incentives are maximized by setting exercise prices
at or near grant-date market prices. When options are not an add-on
to existing compensation, we show that incentives are maximized by
granting options with exercise prices set below grant-date market
prices. Therefore, because executives are risk-averse and undiversified,
it is almost always optimal to set exercise prices at or below grant-date
market prices and almost never optimal to set exercise prices above
grant-date market prices.
The result that options should be issued at or in the money may
seem counterintuitive, since stock prices are expected to increase over
time and option-holders will benefit from routine appreciation. How-
ever, human resource practitioners have long advocated that incentive
plans are most effective when at least partial payouts are likely. Set-
ting high exercise prices reduces the payout probabilities, which in
turn reduces the incentive effectiveness for options held by risk-averse
and undiversified managers.
In summary, options are most valuable (from the employee's per-
spective) when issued at or in the money, and options are least costly
(from the employer's erroneous perspective) when issued at or out of
the money. The natural implication is that options will be issued at the
money. BFW reach a similar conclusion but suggest more sinister un-
derlying motives.
3. Resetting exercise prices.
Options that fall out of the money are perceived to be nearly
worthless to undiversified recipients (because risk-averse individuals
discount payouts that occur with small probabilities). Boards con-
cerned about retaining incumbent employees, while also (erroneously)
37 See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive
Compatibility, 100 Colum L Rev 440,468 n 101 (2002) (discussing the tax consequences of in-the-
money option grants).
38 Hall and Murphy, 33 J Acct Econ at 15-17,23-26 (cited in note 28).
[69:847
Explaining Executive Compensation
perceiving the costs of making new grants to be low, will naturally
tend to reprice options when prices fall. As discussed above, the per-
ceived cost of repricing options increased after the December 1998
accounting change, thus explaining the virtual disappearance of re-
pricing activity after this date.
BFW emphasize two "puzzles" related to repricing practices: (1)
options are only repriced after market downturns and are not sym-
metrically repriced after market upturns, and (2) repricing policies
that are expected by executives distort managerial incentives ex ante.
The first puzzle can be explained by risk-averse employees who
asymmetrically view downside and upside risk. The second puzzle is
best understood by noting that most options are awarded to lower-
level managers and employees who are not making decisions that di-
rectly affect stock prices. In fact, during the 1990s, many companies
repriced options for all employees except the top-five executives39
4. Freedom to unwind incentives.
BFW assert that "firms take surprisingly few steps to prevent ex-
ecutives from unwinding the incentives provided by the grant of op-
tions and restricted stock," and offer this evidence in support of the
managerial power hypothesis." The assertion is likely overstated. Top
executives are often subject to formal or informal ownership guide-
lines that restrict their ability to hedge the risk in personal stock hold-
ings (or to use sales of personal holdings to unwind the risk in new op-
tion grants). In addition, although it is possible to unwind the risk of
unrestricted stock holdings, it is much more difficult to unwind the risk
of options and restricted stock. First, recipients cannot directly hedge
the risk of options and restricted stock since they are precluded from
trading these securities or pledging these securities as collateral and
are also precluded from short-selling company stock. In addition, as
noted by David M. Schizer, there are unfavorable tax consequences to
hedging options and restricted stock. 
4
39 The practice of repricing options below the top five likely reflects punitive SEC disclo-
sure requirements adopted in 1993. In particular, companies repricing options for "proxy-named"
executives are required to provide a justification for the repricing and a detailed table showing all
repricings over the prior ten-year period. Companies can circumvent these disclosure require-
ments by repricing options for lower-level executives (without triggering disclosure) while issuing
new options for top-five executives (without canceling existing options).
40 Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 69 U Chi L Rev at 824 (cited in note 4).
41 See Schizer, 100 Colum L Rev at 474-94 (cited in note 39) (showing that if the option or
restricted stock appreciates after the executive has hedged, the executive will realize ordinary in-
come on the appreciation and an offsetting capital loss on the derivative, but explaining that
hedging is made unappealing by the "mismatch" which results because capital losses cannot be
used to avoid tax on ordinary income).
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In any case, if options are granted (especially below the top-
management group) not to create optimal incentives but rather be-
cause options are perceived to be a low-cost way to convey compensa-
tion, and if recipients rationally understand the risk (due to non-
diversification) of options, then it is not surprising that companies al-
low executives to at least partially unwind the risk through personal
portfolio decisions. Therefore, allowing partial "risk unwinding" is
consistent with the perceived-cost view of executive compensation.
5. Reload options.
When an employee exercises an option with a reload provision,
he receives additional options with an exercise price set to the market
price when the original options were exercised (and the additional op-
tions were granted). The number of new options granted equals the
shares sold to pay the exercise price plus (often, but not always)
shares sold to pay the personal income tax owed on the gain.
Reload provisions are attractive to risk-averse option holders
who want to "lock in" a gain from options without forfeiting the "fu-
ture option value" by exercising early. The economic cost to compa-
nies granting options with reload provisions is high (and the fact that
the company is subsidizing the tax payments largely ignored), but the
perceived cost of adding the provision is low, because the company in-
curs neither cash drain nor accounting charges in adding reload provi-
sions to option plans. Therefore, reload provision are consistent with
the perceived-cost view of executive compensation.
6. International differences in CEO pay.
CEOs in the U.S. receive substantially higher pay levels than
CEOs in other countries, even after controlling for size, industry, and
other environmental and managerial characteristics. The difference in
U.S. pay practices is largely (but not entirely) explained by stock op-
tion compensation, which is much more intensively utilized in the U.S.
Although one cannot make sweeping generalizations regarding
the accounting and tax treatment of option grants outside of the U.S.,
the European data, coupled with the perceived-cost view, suggest that
options are perceived to be less expensive in the U.S. than elsewhere.2
In particular, companies in the U.S. incur no accounting charge when
granting options but receive a tax deduction when the options are ex-
ercised. In Europe, however, the accounting and tax treatment tends
42 See Martin J. Conyon and Kevin J. Murphy, Stock-Based Compensation, in J. McCahery
and L. Renneboog, eds, Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance Regimes and Capi-
tal Markets (forthcoming Oxford 2002).
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to be symmetric: if options are invisible in accounting statements, they
are likely invisible for tax purposes as well. Similarly, if companies de-
duct as compensation expense amounts paid in stock-based compen-
sation, they are likely required to take a charge against accounting
earnings as well. These tax and accounting differences can help ex-
plain why U.S. boards are more generous with their option grants than
are boards in other countries. This evidence, while not fully explaining
international differences in CEO pay, is largely consistent with the
perceived-cost view of executive compensation.
D. Solutions
Under the perceived-cost view, compensation decisions are based
on the perceived cost rather than the (much higher) economic cost of
executive and employee stock options. The perceived-cost view helps
explain many of the details of options plans (exercise prices, vesting
schedules, etc.) analyzed by BFW. More importantly, the perceived-
cost view explains the proliferation of broad-based option programs,
which are difficult to justify on an economic basis. Simply put, when
decisions are based on perceived rather than economic costs, too
many options are granted to too many people.
The economic cost of an option is the "opportunity cost," the
amount the company could raise if it sold the option to an outside in-
vestor rather than giving it to the executive. When an executive re-
ceives a share of restricted stock, the company understands that the
cost of that grant is the market price of the share (perhaps with a dis-
count for potential forfeiture). But because there is no market for
company options issued with characteristics similar to those granted
to executives, the opportunity cost is not obvious. The Black-Scholes
formula, with appropriate adjustments for potential forfeiture and
early exercise, offers a theoretical estimate of the opportunity cost of
executive stock options. This estimate will naturally be above both the
perceived cost of options and the value of options from the perspec-
tive of risk-averse undiversified recipients.
The fact that compensation decisions are based on perceived
rather than economic costs represents a market failure of sorts, similar
to managers who ignore the cost of equity capital when making deci-
sions regarding investments, inventories, and working capital. The so-
lution to this market failure may include remedial education on op-
portunity costs for executives, accountants, analysts, and human-
resource practitioners. A more direct, but controversial, solution in-
volves imposing an accounting charge for stock options. I believe that
an accounting charge would halt the proliferation of broad-based
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plans and would cause companies to limit stock option grants to top-
level executives whose actions directly affect company stock prices.
CONCLUSION
Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker present a compelling case that opti-
mal contracting concerns do not explain the level and structure of ex-
ecutive compensation in U.S. corporations. They offer as an alternative
hypothesis that CEO-influenced boards design pay plans to transfer
rents to top executives in ways that mitigate public outrage. Evidence
offered in support of the managerial power view is almost exclusively
related to features of stock option plans, including why exercise prices
are set at grant-date market prices and are not indexed to general
market movements, why options are "repriced" following market
downturns, why options often contain "reload" provisions, why firms
allow executives to exercise early and diversify (or otherwise hedge
the risk of their option and stock holdings), and why options are more
prevalent in the U.S. than abroad.-'
I offer evidence inconsistent with the managerial power hypothe-
sis and provide an alternative hypothesis based on two assumptions:
(1) because of accounting and cash-flow considerations, companies
(erroneously) perceive the cost of granting options to be far below
their economic cost, and (2) risk-averse undiversified option-
recipients (rationally) perceive the value of options to be below the
company's economic cost of granting options. I show that this "per-
ceived-cost" view is consistent with the evidence presented by BFW,
as well as -with other practices such as broad-based option programs
that are difficult to justify from an optimal contracting standpoint.
The managerial power and perceived-cost views of executive
compensation offer similar predictions about pay patterns and prac-
tices but differ significantly in their policy implications and prescrip-
tions. In particular, mitigating managerial power problems suggests
43 In addition to the option-related evidence, BFW also discuss "gratuitous acquisition-
related goodbye payments" as evidence supporting the managerial power hypothesis. Since,
unlike the other evidence presented, these payments are not directly related to the details of
stock-option grants, I do not offer a perceived-cost explanation for these payments. However,
some remarks are in order. BFW define as "gratuitous" any payments that are not explicitly
mandated by existing change-in-control agreements. However, virtually all the evidence offered
by BFW relates to terms of explicit ex ante change-in-control agreements; they offer scant evi-
dence on the prevalence or magnitude of ex post payments. Moreover, such payments (to the ex-
tent they exist) are not obviously gratuitous or inconsistent with arm's length bargaining. For ex-
ample, boards might pay special bonuses for extraordinary (and unanticipated) efforts in connec-
tion with a merger, or the acquirer might pay retention bonuses to enlist the outgoing executives'
help during the critical transition period. Overall, while I am sympathetic to the view that incum-
bent managers can resist takeover attempts (and am even comfortable calling this "managerial
power"), I do not see the distinction between ex ante and ex post as particularly relevant to the
analysis (except in highlighting that ex ante contracts are often incomplete).
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revising corporate governance to require truly independent boards,
without any real evidence that such changes would lead to improved
corporate performance or more rational compensation decisions. In
contrast, mitigating perceived-cost problems suggests educating man-
agers and boards on the true economic costs of stock options, impos-
ing accounting charges for option grants, and eliminating the asymme-
try between the accounting and tax treatment of executive and em-
ployee stock options.

